AFFORDABLE CARE ACT je a n m . a b r a ha m r o g e r fe l d m a n p et e r gr av e n A B S T R A C T The employer's decision to offer health insurance depends on how much workers value insurance relative to wages, and that value is likely to vary, given the composition of the establishment's workforce and economic incentives such as the preferential tax treatment of premiums for employer-sponsored insurance (ESI). Using the 2008-10 MEPS Insurance Component augmented with information from other sources, we generate new estimates of employers' price-sensitivity of offering insurance. Our results suggest that small and medium-size employers are sensitive to changes in the tax price of insurance, with small employers exhibiting the largest price-sensitivity. Workforce composition and local labor market conditions also influence employer offers. With these model estimates, we predict how provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA)-including the employer shared-responsibility requirement, premium tax credits for exchange-based coverage, and the individual mandate-affect the probability of offering ESI. Findings from this study can inform policy discussions about the implications of ACA provisions as well as subsequent reforms focused on the tax-exempt status of ESI premiums.
I. Introduction
Employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) covered 57 percent of the nonelderly US population in 2013 (American Community Survey 2013) . Compared with individually purchased insurance, ESI has two main advantages for those who are eligible to take it up. The first advantage is the preferential tax treatment of ESI. Premiums paid by employers are exempt from federal and state income taxes, and from Social Security and Medicare taxes. In addition, many employees can pay their share of the insurance premium with pretax dollars if their firm offers a Section 125 plan. The second advantage of ESI is lower administrative costs compared with individual insurance (Buchmueller, Carey, and Levy 2013) . There is a strong negative association between the number of employees covered by ESI and the administrative cost as a percentage of benefit costs (Hay Huggins Company 1987; Karaca-Mandic, Abraham, and Phelps 2011) .
Before 2014, ESI had two additional advantages over individually purchased insurance: no one could be denied coverage and premiums were based on the experience of the group, not an individual policyholder. In 2014, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) altered individual market regulations such that coverage is available to everyone at rates that depend on the experience of all policyholders with modifications limited to age, geography, family composition, and tobacco-user status. However, ESI still enjoys the advantages of taxexempt premiums and lower administrative costs. Other ACA provisions, including the availability of premium subsidies for individual exchange-based coverage, the employer shared-responsibility requirement, and the individual mandate to have insurance, change employers' economic incentives to offer ESI.
Substantial variation exists in the rate at which employers offer insurance to their workers. The most pronounced difference is by firm size. According to the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC), approximately 39.2 percent of private sector establishments with fewer than 50 employees in 2010 offered insurance, compared with 96.4 percent of those with 50 or more workers.
1 Small employers that do not offer health insurance frequently cite price as an important reason for not offering it.
In this study, we analyze employers' decisions to offer insurance, quantify how key ACA provisions implemented in 2014 and later affect employers' economic incentives, and predict how these changing incentives may influence employers' offers of insurance.
A. P R I O R L I T E R A T U R E
Although several studies have analyzed the probability that a worker receives an ESI offer (Gruber and Poterba 1996; Royalty 2000; Bernard and Selden 2002; Abraham, DeLeire, and Royalty 2009) , fewer have focused on the employer's decision to offer health insurance. This is an important distinction. The probability that a worker receives an ESI offer depends on his or her job choice, which is conceivably related to personal characteristics and preferences (e.g., less-healthy workers demand more health care and thus may be more likely to seek jobs that offer ESI). On the other hand, the employer's decision to offer insurance depends on the characteristics of the employees as a group or a subset of them, such as highly compensated workers.
Researchers have used three approaches to study employers' price-sensitivity of offering health insurance: stated preference methods; small-scale policy experiments; and econometric analyses of employer survey data. The first type of research asks firms that do not offer health insurance about their willingness to offer a hypothetical policy at various premiums (Thorpe et al. 1992; Morrisey, Jensen, and Morlock 1994) . These studies have produced a wide range of premium elasticity estimates of offering insurance of between −0.3 and −1.6.
In the late 1980s, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation sponsored several pilot programs to subsidize the cost of insurance for small firms that had not previously offered ESI. Only 5 percent of eligible small firms enrolled, leading evaluators to conclude that employers were not sensitive to price reductions (Helms, Gauthier, and Campion 1992) . In another demonstration project, researchers tested the responses of small employers in New York to a 50 percent premium subsidy and found a very modest increase of 3.5 percentage points in the proportion of small firms offering insurance (Thorpe et al. 1992 ). More recently, Kronick, Olsen, and Gilmer (2008) conducted a randomized controlled trial in which small employers that did not offer group coverage were offered the opportunity to purchase coverage through a San Diego-based HMO. The findings revealed no major changes in offering: even when non-offering small employers could buy coverage at 50 percent of the full premium, fewer than 20 percent did so. A key criticism of such designs was that the temporary nature of the subsidies was unattractive to many employers who did not want to offer insurance and then discontinue it when the subsidies ended.
A third set of studies has used employer survey data to estimate discrete choice models of an employer's decision to offer ESI. These researchers have used two distinct approaches to measure the price of insurance. One group measured the price of insurance by the premium, controlling for policy benefits (Feldman et al. 1997; Long 2001a, 2001b; Hadley and Reschovsky 2002) ; the other group used the tax price of health insurance (Jensen and Gabel 1992; Gruber and Lettau 2004) .
While premiums may be more salient to an employer deciding whether to offer coverage, obtaining unbiased estimates of employer price-sensitivity using this measure is challenging because premiums are not observed for firms that do not offer ESI and must be imputed. Moreover, observed premiums for employers that offer ESI may be endogenous if unobservable factors influence both premiums and the employer's propensity to offer coverage. These studies have identified instruments that are correlated with an establishment's premium but uncorrelated with the firm's demand for insurance, and have predicted premiums for all employers. Different imputation methods may be responsible for different price elasticity estimates in these studies (higher in Feldman et al. (1997) compared with Hadley and Reschovsky (2002) , for example).
The other approach uses the "tax price" of insurance. Because the employer-paid portion of the premium (or the total premium of Section 125 plans) is tax-exempt, one dollar of health insurance costs less than one dollar of wage compensation. Also, because the tax price depends on individuals' federal and state marginal tax rates, higher-income workers face a lower tax price for insurance, leading them to demand this form of compensation more than lower-income workers, holding other factors constant. Formally, the tax price of insurance can be expressed as the following: The most prominent study using this approach is by Gruber and Lettau (2004) , who investigated both the employer's decision to offer coverage and covered spending. Their primary data source was the Bureau of Labor Statistics National Compensation Survey (NCS), a survey of four, six, or eight randomly chosen workers within establishments, for 1983-95. Because they lacked detailed information on an establishment's workers (e.g., demographics and nonearned taxable income), they augmented the NCS with information from the Current Population Survey and Statistics of Income. They used NBER's TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts 1993) to compute federal and state marginal tax rates for workers in the sampled jobs and created an average marginal tax rate weighted by the odds of being married and of itemizing.
Because unobserved variables that affect the tax price might be correlated with the demand for insurance, Gruber and Lettau (2004) instrumented the tax price with a "simulated tax price" computed only as a function of state, 10 income deciles, and year (510 stateincome decile cells per year). This means that their offering model is identified through the interactions of states, income groups, and years. In addition to the simulated tax price, their offering model included industry, occupation, firm size, earnings, number of sampled workers from the establishment, state, and year. The estimated tax-price elasticity of offering ESI for small firms was −0.688, and for medium-size firms it was −0.128 (although this estimate was not significantly different from 0). Because almost all large employers in their data offered insurance, they were unable to estimate an offering elasticity for this group.
The lack of nationally representative data has been a barrier to recent analysis of employers' ESI offers. In fact, almost two decades have elapsed since the employer data analyzed by Gruber and Lettau (2004) and others (Feldman et al. 1997; Marquis and Long 2001a; Hadley and Reschovsky 2002; Bundorf 2002) were collected. In the interim, significant changes have occurred to the institution of employer-sponsored insurance. Most notably, the rising cost of medical care has led to changes in types of benefit designs offered by insurers, including increasing prevalence of high-deductible health plans. Insurance markets have also become more concentrated over this period (Emmons, Guardado, and Kane 2012) . Finally, expansion of public insurance programs (e.g., Medicaid/CHIP) has resulted in new alternatives to ESI for certain workers or dependents who meet specific eligibility guidelines. Given these and other changes, there is value in having new evidence about employer offers of ESI. Even barring secular changes in insurance markets, additional evidence regarding employers' price-sensitivity of offering insurance would be valuable to supplement Gruber and Lettau (2004) .
B. S T U D Y O B J E C T I V E A N D C O N T R I B U T I O N
Using the 2008-10 MEPS-IC-a rich data source containing detailed information on establishments and workforce characteristics-we investigate the factors influencing employers' decisions to offer insurance and provide new estimates of employer pricesensitivity. Then using our model estimates, we predict employers' responses to key ACA provisions. Our results indicate that small and medium-size employers are sensitive to the tax price of insurance, with small employers having the largest price-sensitivity. Our prediction exercise suggests that across the firm size distribution, employers are expected to reduce their propensity to offer ESI, but that reductions are offset by substitution to coverage through individual exchange-based plans, based upon the new incentives introduced by the ACA.
II. Conceptual Framework
Economists have developed theoretical models to predict how workers' total compensation is allocated between cash wages and fringe benefits including health insurance (Summers 1989; Goldstein and Pauly 1976; Pauly 1986 ). These models assume the employer offers a combination of wages and health insurance that minimizes its labor costs, subject to maintaining employees' utility at a level that keeps the establishment competitive in the labor market (Dowd and Feldman 1987) . The employer's decision to offer health insurance depends on how much workers value insurance relative to wages. This value is likely to vary, given the composition of an establishment's workforce.
In this general approach, individual employees have preferences regarding the optimal allocation of their total compensation into wages and health insurance. Workers' preferences for health insurance versus wages depend on a number of factors, notably family income. Given the current tax-exempt status of employer-paid premiums (or total premiums for Section 125 plans), workers who pay higher federal and state marginal tax rates face a lower price for health insurance relative to wages compared with workers with lower incomes and marginal tax rates. Thus, employers with workers whose tax price of insurance is lower, on average, should be more likely to offer health insurance. In addition to the direct effect of income on the tax price of insurance, higher-income workers may demand more medical care as an input to the production of health (Grossman 1972) . Insurance may also provide additional protection from loss of household wealth, which is positively correlated with income.
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In addition to income, other factors that influence workers' preferences for health insurance may include their expected demand for medical care. Alternative sources of coverage (e.g., spousal coverage or individually purchased coverage) and alternative sources of care (e.g., charity care) available to them may also affect their choices.
In this framework, we assume that an employer can observe its workers' preferences (or variables that are proxies for them) and the employer can aggregate those preferences when it decides to allocate total compensation into wages and insurance. Several studies have suggested how the employer aggregates employees' preferences. Goldstein and Pauly (1976) proposed that the employer considers the preferences of the average worker; however, preferences of the median worker or highly compensated workers also may be important (Danzon 1989; Gruber and Lettau 2004) .
Employers must also consider the transaction costs of offering health insurance when selecting the optimal combination of wages and insurance. Since the administrative costs of ESI are likely to be fixed or quasi-fixed, larger employers can spread those costs over more workers relative to small firms. Thus, we expect larger firms to be more likely to offer insurance. Other factors that vary geographically, including state regulation of health insurance markets, may affect the administrative costs of ESI.
Finally, an employer must set total compensation at a level that keeps the establishment competitive in the labor market. We expect several factors to be correlated with local labor market conditions and compensation levels, including firm size, industry, the employer size distribution in the local market, and macroeconomic conditions (e.g., the unemployment rate).
Based on the conceptual framework above, an employer's decision to offer health insurance depends on how much its workers value that benefit relative to wages. This value likely varies based on the composition of an establishment's workforce (Work), including workers' family incomes, demographics, and tax-filing status, given the tax-exempt status of premiums.
3 Additionally, we expect that establishment characteristics (Estab) and local labor market conditions (Labor) influence the compensation packages offered by employers as they compete for workers in the labor market. Finally, we consider statespecific, time-invariant factors (State) that may influence employer offering as well as year indicators (Time) to capture secular trends in the outcome over the study period.
The offer model can be written as follows:
The dependent variable is the difference in the log-utilities of offering ESI and an "outside good" of not offering ESI. If the employer does not offer ESI, this does not necessarily mean that the workers will be uninsured. They may have access to ESI through a spouse or they can buy insurance in the individual market. 4 However, as noted above, the individual market lacks economies of scale and does not offer a premium tax subsidy, 5 so few workers take up that option (Marquis and Long 1995) . By convention, the log-utility of the outside good is normalized to zero.
Neither of the utilities in equation 2 is observed. Rather, we observe variables that influence the utility of offering ESI, and we postulate that the employer will offer ESI if 
III. Data and Measures
In this section, we describe the data and measures used to estimate an employer's decision to offer insurance.
A. D A T A
The primary data source is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey-Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) List Sample for 2008, 2009, and 2010. 6 The MEPS-IC is a nationally representative, establishment-level survey of US employers that collects information on the provision of health insurance. 7 The employer reports on offering insurance and the number of workers enrolled. The survey also includes questions about an employer's workforce (age, gender, wage-level category (<$11/hour; $11-26/hour; >$26/hour), part-time workers, and union presence) and characteristics of the establishment (industry category, business tenure, ownership status, multiple locations, establishment size, firm size, 8 and state). Because employers may offer ESI depending on local labor market conditions, we merge information from the US Bureau of the Census County Business Patterns file and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008-10) on the establishment size distribution and unemployment rate for the county in which the establishment is located. We restrict our attention to private sector establishments because government establishments almost always offer ESI.
B. M E A S U R E S
Our dependent variable, Offer, is an indicator for whether an establishment offers insurance during the survey year.
9 This indicator equals one if the establishment reported offering insurance and had at least one employee enrolled in coverage, zero if not. 10 6 Because the MEPS-IC data are not available in the public domain, the research team obtained approval from the US Bureau of the Census to use the MEPS-IC. All analyses were conducted in the Minnesota Census Research Data Center. 7 The three years of data from the MEPS-IC are treated as repeated cross sections. Unlike the Household Component, the IC does not maintain an overlapping panel design. 8 The unit of observation is an establishment, although the survey includes information about the firm size associated with that establishment. 9 One potential limitation is that multilocation firms may decide to offer insurance at the firm level rather than at the establishment level. 10 While the additional criterion of having at least one employee enrolled affected a very small proportion of observations, it distinguishes this analysis from the public-use MEPS-IC summary tables.
Our key explanatory variable is the tax price (TP) of ESI. This captures the price of a dollar of health insurance relative to a dollar of wage income, given the tax-exempt status of employer-paid premiums (total premiums for Section 125 plans). Tax prices vary within establishments given variation in workers' family incomes, and they vary across establishments given different income distributions. Tax prices for similar establishments differ across states and time because of variation in states' income tax policies. While the MEPS-IC has basic information about the wage distribution of workers in each establishment, it does not have detailed information about workers' family incomes or tax-filing status. Also, and not surprisingly, it lacks a direct measure of the tax price of ESI. Thus, we augmented the MEPS-IC with information on workers' families from the 2007 and 2008 MEPS-Household Component (HC), a nationally representative sample of the noninstitutionalized US population. We estimated the worker's family income, tax-filing status, and the tax price of ESI and used a statistical matching method to impute these variables from the MEPS-HC to the MEPS-IC. Below we describe our approach for imputing this information.
From the MEPS-HC, we began by selecting full-time workers (those working 30 or more hours per week) in private sector establishments. We focus on full-time workers since most part-time workers are not eligible for ESI. We computed total family income, defining the family using the Health Insurance Eligibility Unit (HIEU) identifier on the MEPS-HC. Then we estimated three OLS regression models of total annual family income, stratifying the samples by the worker's hourly wage category (<$11/hour; $11-26/hour; >$26/hour).
11 The regressions included whether the worker is female, age 50 or older, a union member, his or her reported establishment size, multilocation establishment, onedigit industry, and state. All the explanatory variables are common to both the MEPS-HC and the MEPS-IC. For example, in the MEPS-HC, "female" is a binary indicator, whereas in the MEPS-IC, the establishment is asked about the proportion of its employees that are female. We generated three predicted values of family income (measured continuously in dollars) for each MEPS-IC establishment and combined the predicted values into a categorical variable with 10 income categories for the tax-price imputation (described below).
Using the same set of explanatory variables as in the family income equations, we estimated an equation for the worker's tax-filing status and created an imputed tax-filing status variable for workers in the IC. Tax-filing status was classified as "single filer" versus all other categories (single head-of-household, married filing separately, widow with qualifying dependent, and married filing jointly).
To impute tax prices, we used NBER's TAXSIM software and all available tax-related input values for each worker in the MEPS-HC to estimate workers' marginal federal and state income tax rates, OASDI, and Medicare Hospital Insurance Taxes. 12 We then used equation 1 to compute a tax price for each worker in the MEPS-HC. 13 Next, we estimated three tax-price regressions, stratifying the samples by the worker's hourly wage category. The explanatory variables included female, age 50 and older, single tax-filer status, family income category, state, income category interacted with state, establishment size, employment at a multilocation firm, and industry. Using the model estimates, we predicted three tax prices for each establishment. In the final step, we calculated the weighted average family income and weighted average tax price for each establishment where the weights were the proportions of an establishment's workers in each wage category.
Identification of the ESI offer model requires that at least one variable in the tax-price equation can be excluded from the offering equation. Our identification strategy relies on differences in the progressivity of marginal income tax rates across states during 2008-10. In 2008, seven states did not have state income taxes. Among states with income taxes, we observe wide variation in the number of brackets and rates. For example, in Arizona the maximum rate in 2008 was 4.54 percent, in contrast to Vermont's rate of 9.5 percent. 14 These differences are captured by interactions of income category and state in the tax-price equation and exclusion of these interactions from the offering equation. 15 We explored another source of identification: variation in the progressivity of income tax rates by filing status across states (by interacting filing status with state). These interactions may affect the tax price but they should be unrelated to unobserved variables that affect the demand for insurance. For example, families may want health insurance more than singles do, but there is no reason why families in one state should want health insurance more than families in another state do. However, these interactions were not statistically significant in the tax-price equation, so we dropped them.
We included several additional workforce attributes directly measured in the MEPS-IC: the percentage of workers at an establishment who are part-time; indicator variables for the percentage of an establishment's workers who are female (≤33 percent, 34-66 percent, >66 percent); indicator variables for the percentage of an establishment's workers who are age 50 or older (<20, 20-50, more than 50); and an indicator variable for whether the establishment has any unionized workers.
We included several establishment characteristics (Estab) reported in the MEPS-IC: indicators for firm size (0-9 (reference), 10-24, 25-49, 50-99, 100-499) ; whether the establishment has multiple locations; one-digit industry categories (religious, civil, or other nonprofit is the reference); business tenure (1-4 years (reference), 5-9 years, 10 + years); and nonprofit ownership (for-profit is the reference category). 16 worker as if they lived in every state. We then selected the state-specific observation after bringing the file into the RDC where we could access the MEPS-HC with state identifiers. 13 We assumed that the OASDI and Medicare HI tax rates together were 7.65 percent. 14 For a detailed list of state income tax rates, refer to http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content /PDF/state income rates.pdf. 15 Unlike Gruber and Lettau (2004), we were not able to include variation over time in our instrumented tax price. This is because federal and state tax rates did not change in important ways during the period of our study. 16 We used multiple imputations and STATA's "nearest-neighbor" approach to address item nonresponse issues for some of the workforce and establishment measures. This method uses linear regressions to predict Local labor market conditions (Labor) were measured by the unemployment rate for the county in which the establishment is located. We expect the unemployment rate to be negatively related to an employer's decision to offer insurance, because employers may stop offering coverage to cut costs when faced with declining profits (Cawley and Simon 2005; Marquis and Long 2001b) . We also included the percentage of establishments in the county with more than 50 workers. We expect a greater concentration of larger establishments in the market to positively influence insurance offers.
We included state fixed effects to control for state-specific, time-invariant factors that may influence employer offering.
17 Additionally, we included indicators for each year to capture time trends.
IV. Econometric Analysis
We used binary logit and STATA 12.0/SE statistical software to estimate the employer offering model. To allow more flexible estimation of the model parameters, we stratified establishments into three groups based on whether the establishment was part of a small firm (0 to 49 workers), medium-size firm (50 to 499), or large firm (500 or more workers).
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Following model estimation, we used the STATA margins command to estimate marginal effects and tax-price elasticities of offering insurance. All estimates were weighted to represent the population of US private sector establishments. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for establishments in the MEPS-IC in 2008 , 2009 , and 2010 , stratified by firm size category and offer status. The weighted average tax price across all establishments is 0.65. By firm size and offer status, the weighted average tax price is lower among small and medium-size offering versus non-offering establishments. Employees in offering establishments have higher weighted average family incomes relative to those in non-offering establishments. Table 1 also shows distinctive patterns by industry. For example, employees in accommodation, food service, and recreation industries are much less likely to be in establishments that offer insurance relative to employees in industries that provide professional services. Small and medium-size employers with some unionized employees are more likely to offer insurance. However, the opposite is true for large employers.
V. Offer Model Results
Marginal effects and standard errors for the three binary logit models are reported in Table 2 . To more easily interpret whether employers are sensitive to the tax price of ESI, the outcomes of interest based on a set of explanatory variables (firm size, industry, and state). Values for the observations with missing workforce and establishment information were imputed from establishments with similar explanatory variables. 17 We do not explicitly include measures of the insurance market environment in the model. However, state fixed effects should control for differences in market structure and regulations that do not change across states during the study period. 18 The firm size indicators mentioned above (0-9 (reference), 10-24, 25-49, 50-99, 100-499) were included in the three equations as appropriate.
T A B L E 1 .
Descriptive statistics by firm size strata and offer status we calculated the tax-price elasticity of the probability of offering insurance. These results are summarized in Table 3 . There is a clear gradient in the tax-price elasticity by firm size. Small employers (0 to 49 workers) are the most price-sensitive with an average taxprice elasticity of −0.82. Thus, a 10 percent decrease in the average tax price (e.g., from 0.65 to about 0.59) is associated with an 8.2 percent increase in the probability of offering insurance, holding all else constant. Medium-size employers (50 to 499 workers) also are price-sensitive, with an average tax-price elasticity of −0.35. The tax-price elasticity for large employers (500 or more workers) is not statistically significant. Our results for small employers are "in the ballpark" of the average elasticity (−0.688) that Gruber and Lettau (2004) found. In contrast, Gruber and Lettau found the estimated elasticity for medium-size firms was not significantly different from zero, and they were not able to estimate an elasticity for large firms. In addition to the average tax price, we considered alternative measures of an establishment's tax price. As noted above, several studies have suggested how the employer aggregates employees' preferences (Goldstein and Pauly 1976; Danzon 1989; Gruber and Lettau 2004) . In a sensitivity check, we used the tax price for the highest-wage workers in each establishment and found a statistically insignificant relation with offering insurance. One possible explanation is that we are constrained by the MEPS-IC definition of "highestwage" workers to individuals earning more than $26 per hour. Alternatively, employers may be less responsive to the tax price of their highest-wage workers than to the average tax price.
As discussed above, we expect that workers' family incomes are correlated with preferences for health insurance versus wages. The estimates from Table 2 show that average family income (10,000s of dollars) of workers in an establishment predicts ESI offering for small and medium-size employers. For medium-size employers, an increase of $10,000 in average family income is associated with a 0.04 increase in the probability of an ESI offer. The effect for small employers is of similar size.
Other workforce characteristics, such as the age and sex distribution of an establishment's workers, are related to preferences for insurance. Small employers with between 20 percent and 50 percent of workers age 50 and older are more likely to offer ESI (0.071) than small establishments with a "young" workforce (less than 20 percent of workers age 50 or older). Interestingly, we find a similar pattern (although of smaller magnitude) for medium-size employers. Having a higher percentage of older workers is inversely related to offering insurance for large employers, conditional on other factors.
The percentage of female workers has inconsistent effects on the employer's decision to offer health insurance. Small employers where at least one-third of the workforce is female are more likely to offer ESI than small employers with predominantly male workers. In contrast, large employers with a high percentage of female workers are less likely to offer insurance.
Given the quasi-fixed costs of insurance administration, employers may be less likely to offer insurance if they hire a high percentage of part-time workers. We find a modest negative relationship between the percentage of part-time workers at an establishment and its probability of offering ESI. A 10 percent increase in the percentage of part-time labor is associated with a 0.031 decrease in the probability of offering ESI among small employers, with smaller effects for medium-size and large employers.
Our final workforce characteristic is an indicator for the presence of unionized workers in the establishment. This is associated with a 0.061 increase in the probability that a small establishment offers health insurance, whereas the union effect is negative for large employers (−0.041). Unionization is not statistically significant for medium-size employers.
The results for other establishment characteristics generally align with our predictions. For example, a small or medium-sized employer's probability of offering insurance is positively related to its size even within strata. Nonprofit employers are more likely to offer insurance relative to for-profit employers across the firm size distribution. And, business tenure among small employers exhibits a positive and statistically significant relation with the probability of offering insurance.
There is a small but significant inverse relation between the unemployment rate of the county in which the establishment operates and offering ESI for small employers only. Finally, a higher proportion of large establishments in the county is associated with a higher probability of offering ESI among small and large employers.
VI. Predicting the Effects of Key ACA Provisions on Employer Offer Probabilities

A. C H A N G E S I N E C O N O M I C I N C E N T I V E U N D E R T H E A C A
Under the ACA, employers have the same choice that was present before federal health reform: to offer ESI or not to offer ESI. But in 2014, workers without an offer of ESI gained a new option to purchase individual coverage in newly created exchanges with incomebased premium subsidies. In other words, there are now three options for workers: ESI; individual exchange coverage; and the "outside good" that includes coverage through a spouse, public insurance for those who are eligible, the purchase of individual insurance outside the exchange, 19 and remaining uninsured. Because the ACA changed the economic attractiveness of particular sources of health insurance as well as individuals' overall incentive to have insurance, it is important to consider all three choices when predicting employer behavior. Although we consider all three options, we are constrained by having only one offer equation. Thus, we assume that the same coefficients and unmeasured factors in the model's constant term that affect the choice of offering ESI versus the outside good in equation 2 can be applied to the choice of individual exchange coverage versus the outside good. This assumption is reasonable if the arguments in the utility function (e.g., tax price, income, and demographics) and their effects on workers' utility are the same for both sources of insurance. We discuss this assumption further in the limitations section.
While we assume the coefficients are the same, ESI and individual exchange coverage have different tax prices. Below we describe how each ACA provision we consider affects the tax price of insurance. We model the sum of these effects as a single change in the tax price-one for ESI and one for the individual exchange policy. a.. individual mandate. The ACA requires most individuals to obtain qualified coverage or pay a penalty. When fully implemented, the annual penalty for a single person will be the greater of $695 (or up to three times that amount for a family ($2,085)) or 2.5 percent of family income. Employees can avoid this penalty by choosing either ESI or the individual exchange option. We used information on the predicted distribution of workers in single versus multiperson households (based on imputed tax-filing status of workers) within each establishment and the dollar amounts above to estimate an average penalty per worker for each establishment.
a.. esi tax subsidy. Under the existing tax code, the employer-paid portion of the ESI premium (or the total premium for employers with Section 125 status) is exempt from income and payroll taxes. The ACA did not change this policy. We estimated predictive models of ESI premiums and the employer-paid portion of premiums. 20 After inflating all amounts to 2015 dollars, we calculated the value of the tax subsidy by multiplying the predicted tax-exempt premium by (1 − average tax price) as defined previously.
a.. employer shared-responsibility requirement. If a firm with
at least 50 full-time-equivalent workers does not offer coverage in 2015 and any full-time employee receives a premium tax credit for purchasing insurance in an exchange, the firm pays an annual penalty of $2,000 times the number of full-time employees less 30. We used the following formula to estimate the establishment's penalty: Penalty = (number of the full-time workers at firm − 30) × $2,000 × (share of the firm's employees at the establishment) (5), and then divided this value by the number of full-time workers at the establishment to express it on a per-worker basis. Because the MEPS-IC does not identify the number of full-time workers at the firm level, we used information on the number of part-time and full-time workers at each establishment and assumed that the distributions at the firm and establishment levels are similar. If an employer that currently offers ESI drops it in 2015, its workers lose the value of the ESI tax subsidy. We assume the employer must adjust wages upward to maintain workers' total compensation at its prior level. 21 We raised the incomes of workers in establishments that offered insurance by an amount equal to the tax-exempt premium less the employer shared-responsibility requirement ("employer penalty") and divided by 1.0765 (since the employer must pay payroll taxes on the increase in wages). 22 We adjusted incomes of 20 Explanatory variables for our ESI premium and employer-paid portion of premium regressions included firm size category, wage category, multilocation firm, industry, ownership status, business tenure, workforce demographics for age and sex distribution, union presence, and state. 21 We assume the adjustment will be through wages only, but employers could adjust other types of compensation, such as making additional contributions to retirement plans. 22 It is difficult to know whether employers will behave this way or use a more refined approach when making wage adjustments. Moreover, we assume no stickiness in adjusting compensation packages. If this is difficult, employers may not drop ESI until they can adjust workers' compensation packages.
workers in larger establishments that did not have an offer downward by the amount of the employer penalty divided by 1.0765.
a.. exchange subsidies. Starting in 2014, individuals who lack an ESI offer can buy subsidized insurance in exchanges. The value of the exchange subsidy equals the premium of a benchmark health insurance plan, less a percentage based on the family's income relative to the federal poverty level (FPL). The benchmark plan is the second-lowest cost "silver plan," which has a 70 percent actuarial value. We used a multistep process to estimate an average exchange subsidy per worker. First, we estimated the average family size 23 for workers in each establishment and used this information along with the average family income to identify the corresponding FPL amount. Next, we identified the second-lowest silver plan premium in each state for singles and families using the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 2014 ACA silver plan data set. Because there are premiums for multiple types of families on the file, for singles we used premiums for a 27-year-old and 50-year-old and computed a weighted average. For families, we used the premium for a family with two 30-year-old adults and two children and adjusted it upward using a standardized age band to more closely align it with the average age of workers with ESI. We then created an overall average premium that reflects both types of households and adjusted these premiums to 2015 dollars. Third, we used FPL guidelines, the 2015 subsidy schedule, average family income, and our state-specific silver premiums, to calculate the out-of-pocket maximum and the value of the subsidy that a worker with average family income at the establishment would receive.
We considered two other insurance attributes that are affected by the ACA: administrative loading fees and coverage generosity. a.. administrative loading fees. The values of ESI and the individual exchange option may differ because of differences in loading fees, defined as the percentage of expected benefits paid out for administrative costs and profits. Karaca-Mandic, Abraham, and Phelps (2011) found that loading fees for ESI varied from 37 percent in firms with fewer than 100 workers to 4 percent in firms with more than 10,000 workers. Historically, loading fees for the individual market have been quite high. Proponents of insurance exchanges argue that loading fees will fall because of the elimination of medical underwriting and stronger competition among insurers resulting from better information on price and quality. Additionally, the ACA regulates medical loss ratio (MLR) for the individual and fully insured small and large group markets. The MLR is the percentage of premium revenues paid for clinical benefits. The regulation specifies a minimum MLR of 80 percent in the individual and small group markets (approximately a 20 percent loading fee). To account for the joint effects of economies of scale and MLR regulations, we assume ESI loading fees of 20 percent for firms with fewer than 100 workers, 15 percent for those with 100-9,999 workers, and 4 percent for firm sizes of 10,000 or more. Based on individual market insurers' early compliance with the MLR regulation, we assume a loading fee of 20 percent for individual exchange coverage. a.. coverage generosity. Individuals switching from ESI to an individual exchange policy may choose a silver plan (with 70 percent actuarial value) because that plan's 23 We define a family using the health insurance eligibility unit definition from the MEPS-HC. premium determines their subsidy. Alternatively, they may purchase coverage similar to what their employer offered. Empirical evidence suggests that ESI plans, on average, have a higher actuarial value than individual-market plans (Gabel et al. 2012) . We assumed that workers who switch to exchange insurance would purchase coverage similar to ESI. To account for this, we used information on ESI premiums and our loading fee assumptions for exchange coverage to estimate the exchange premium for "ESI-like" coverage.
Because the ESI tax subsidy, employer penalty, individual mandate, and exchange subsidy values are all measured in dollars, we needed to convert them to changes in the tax price. To do this, we estimated a regression model to predict the total ESI premium for each establishment that reflects an overall weighted average of expected single and family coverage types. These values are used directly in the estimation of the baseline and 2015 ESI tax prices. For the exchange tax price, we adjusted this value for differences in loading fees and expectations about coverage generosity preferences. As the final step, we aggregated the effects predicted above and expressed them as changes in the tax price:
Baseline ESI tax price = 1 − (ESI tax subsidy/predicted ESI total premium) 
.
B. H Y P O T H E T I C A L E X A M P L E
We illustrate these calculations with a hypothetical example: what are the economic incentives for a medium-size, self-insured employer to offer ESI versus the "outside good" in 2015? Let's suppose the premium of the ESI plan is $6,000 and the marginal tax rates of workers result in an average tax price of 0.697. If the employer offers ESI, all employees who are eligible for coverage can have a $1,818 tax subsidy ($6,000 × (1 − 0.697)), given the tax treatment of ESI premiums. Also, if the employer offers ESI, an employee avoids the employer penalty that would be passed on to him in lower wages ($1,394) and the individual penalty if he goes without insurance (assumed to be $1,000). 24 In this stylized example, the net cost of an ESI policy versus the outside good is $1,788 and the tax price is 0.298 (0.298 = 1 − (($1,818 + $1,394 + $1,000) / $6,000)).
We can also consider the choice of an individual exchange policy versus the outside good in 2015. Unlike ESI, there is no tax subsidy for the premium paid by the worker. Let's assume that the exchange premium for an "ESI-like" plan is $6,175. We estimated 24 The wage adjustment resulting from the employer penalty assumes that each worker bears an equal share of the penalty imposed on the firm. These changes in wages may not occur instantly in 2014. We model the long-run effects as if the changes have fully occurred. this value by multiplying the predicted ESI premium for the worker by a factor equal to ((1 + exchange loading fee)/(1 + ESI loading fee)). If the worker has low family income and does not have access to an alternative source of ESI or public coverage, he will qualify for a premium tax credit. For example, a single worker earning approximately $23,000 per year or about 200 percent of FPL would be required to pay up to 6.3 percent of his income toward the premium. If one assumes this policy is similar to a silver plan, then the value of the credit would be about $3,300. By purchasing coverage, the worker also avoids the individual mandate penalty. In this case, the cost of an individual exchange policy is $1,875 ($6,175 − ($3,300 + $1,000)) and the tax price is 0.303.
T A B L E 4 . Estimated average value of economic incentives by firm size of employer
C. P R E D I C T I N G T H E O P T I O N S O F E S I O F F E R , I N D I V I D U A L E X C H A N G E , A N D O U T S I D E G O O D
After aggregating the effects described above and expressing them as tax prices, we used the model estimates and the new ESI tax price to predict the probabilities of an ESI offer versus the outside good in 2015. We then repeated this step using the 2015 individual exchange tax price to predict its probability versus the outside good. In the final step in this exercise, we recovered the unconditional probability of offering ESI (Pr ESI ), the exchange option (Pr EXC ), and the outside good (Pr NO ) through algebraic manipulation as noted below:
. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics by firm size for the estimated average ESI tax subsidy, individual mandate penalty, employer shared-responsibility requirement, and exchange subsidy in establishments that offer insurance and those that do not. All estimates are weighted to reflect the number of private sector US establishments.
D. R E S U L T S
As noted above, the value of the ESI tax subsidy depends on workers' incomes and plan premiums. We estimate that the average ESI tax subsidy ranges from $2,985 to $4,041, depending on establishment size and offer status. The average tax subsidy per worker is considerably higher among employers that offer insurance relative to non-offering employers.
Across all establishments, the individual mandate penalty per worker is approximately $1,607, with values ranging from $1,573 to $1,619 across the firm size distribution. Small firms and their workers are also exempt from the shared-responsibility requirement if they do not offer coverage in 2015. In contrast, the average employer penalty for medium-size and large establishments that do not currently offer insurance is between $793 and $1,812 per worker.
The average exchange subsidy per worker reflects differences in workers' incomes across firm sizes. Notably, the average exchange subsidy for workers with non-offering small and medium employers is more than twice as large as with those that sponsor insurance, suggesting that workers with non-offering employers have considerably lower incomes. Table 5 summarizes the tax prices for baseline and 2015 ESI offers and the 2015 individual exchange option. Overall, the average tax price for ESI at baseline is 0.65. The second and third columns of Table 5 summarize the average tax prices for ESI and the individual exchange option in 2015. Recall that the ESI tax price incorporates the value of the ESI tax subsidy, the individual mandate, and the employer penalty, whereas the 2015 individual exchange tax price includes the value of exchange subsidies and the individual mandate.
The average 2015 ESI tax price is 0.53, which is considerably lower than the baseline ESI tax price. All else equal, this implies that an ESI offer will be more attractive in 2015. Workers who choose the individual exchange option forgo the ESI tax subsidy, but they may be eligible for exchange subsidies if they are lower-income and do not have access to another ESI offer through a spouse or public insurance. The estimated average tax price for the individual exchange option is 0.76. Table 5 also illustrates how the 2015 tax prices vary by workforce and establishment characteristics. The average ESI tax price for small employers (0-49 workers) falls modestly between baseline and 2015 (0.65 to 0.57) compared with large firms (0.64 to 0.38), in part due to the exemption of small firms from the shared-responsibility requirement. Table 6 reports predictions for the probabilities of an ESI offer, the individual exchange option, and the outside good following the introduction of key ACA provisions for small, medium-size, and large employers, respectively. Column 1 is the average predicted probability of the baseline (pre-2014) ESI offer. Columns 2, 3, and 4 are unconditional, average predicted probabilities of an ESI offer, the individual exchange option, and the outside good in 2015.
For small employers, the average predicted probability of an ESI offer falls from 0.41 at baseline to 0.32 in 2015 (see column 2). However, this decline is more than offset by the individual exchange option, which has an average predicted probability of 0.21. The outside good probability falls from 0.59 at baseline to 0.46 in 2015. In the small employer segment, individual exchange option. For large employers, the probability of an ESI offer falls by 8 percent, but again this reduction is more than offset by increased individual exchange enrollment. Predicted changes in ESI offers differ considerably by industry, with the largest reductions for small employers in accommodation, food service, entertainment, and recreation services industries; religious, civil, and other nonprofit organizations; and construction, agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting. However, the model also predicts that a sizable fraction of workers in these establishments will shift to the individual exchange option.
The demographic composition of an establishment's workers is important for predicting changes in ESI offers, particularly among small employers. Employers with an older workforce (more than 50 percent of the workers age 50 or older) have a lower predicted decrease in the probability of offering ESI compared with establishments with smaller concentrations of older workers.
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VII. Discussion and Conclusion
Several features of ESI make it more attractive than coverage purchased individually. ESI has lower administrative costs and preferential tax treatment of premiums relative to individual coverage. As a result, individuals get more "bang for their buck" through ESI. However, employers may not offer workers a choice of plans, and the plan(s) they offer may not be what the individuals would have chosen on their own. With the introduction of exchanges and the availability of plans with different actuarial values, workers may select plans that align more closely with their preferences.
This study provides new evidence regarding worker, establishment, and labor market factors that influence an establishment's probability of offering health insurance. Small employers (49 or fewer workers) exhibit the strongest price-sensitivity, with an average tax-price elasticity of offering ESI of −0.82. Medium-size employers are less pricesensitive, although the estimated elasticity of −0.35 is still statistically different from zero. Other factors that predict an employer's probability of offering health insurance include higher average family income and a higher percentage of female workers, the latter among small employers. Small employers are sensitive to local labor market conditions, with an inverse relation between unemployment rates and offering insurance. In contrast, a higher proportion of establishments in the county with 50 workers or more is associated with a higher probability that both small and large employers offer ESI, presumably to remain competitive in the labor market.
While ESI has been eroding slowly over the past decade because of rising costs, its future may be affected even more by public policy, including key federal health reforms that are changing the economic incentives that workers and their employers face. We predict that overall demand for health insurance will rise, driven by workers' desires to avoid the individual mandate penalty as well as the availability of premium tax credits in exchanges. However, the average probability of offering ESI will decline with full implementation of the ACA, although our estimates vary a lot by firm size and industry.
Moreover, an employer's decision to offer insurance is binary, but the subsequent effects of that decision on workers may be quite varied. Clearly, low-wage workers who lack access to ESI through a spouse/partner stand to gain the most from premium tax credits offered in exchanges. In contrast, high-wage workers may not qualify for a subsidy and pay the full premium. Further, because exchange premiums will be age-rated, older workers will likely face higher premiums than they would in an employer group setting.
Some limitations of the prediction exercise should be noted. First, we do not consider all ACA provisions that may affect employers. One example is the availability of premium tax credits for small, low-wage employers to offer ESI. While this subsidy may increase the probability of ESI offers, early evaluations suggest that it has been ineffective (General Accounting Office 2012). Also, we did not model the value of cost-sharing credits that will be available for non-offered workers with incomes below 250 percent FPL who obtain exchange-based coverage. These credits raise the actuarial value of the silver plan to a more generous plan with 94 percent actuarial value for individuals with incomes of 100-150 percent FPL, 87 percent for those between 150 percent and 200 percent FPL, and 73 percent for those between 200 percent and 250 percent. 26 This will increase the value of the exchange subsidy, making this option more attractive for employers with workers who qualify. Third, we did not model the ACA provision that imposes penalties on employers that do not offer "affordable" coverage for certain lower-income workers. We assume employers will offer affordable coverage.
Another important limitation is that we used the estimated parameters from the ESI offer model to predict the probability of the individual exchange option. Implicitly, we assumed that workers perceive the quality of ESI and exchange insurance as identical. Although we accounted for differences in tax prices, loading fees, and covered spending (we assumed that workers who purchase individual exchange coverage will "buy up" their covered spending to the ESI level), we could not account for other potentially important factors-such as higher shopping costs in the exchanges. If workers perceive their current ESI offers as better than exchange coverage, our model may predict too much flight from ESI to exchanges.
Finally, given the uncertainty regarding how well insurance exchanges will function over time in terms of product offerings, premiums, and the consumer experience, employers may take a "wait and see" attitude before switching from ESI to the individual exchange option. Looking ahead, it will be important to monitor employer responses and to assess the impact of ACA provisions on workers' choices.
